TY - JOUR
T1 - Simultaneous versus sequential public good provision and the role of refunds - An experimental study
AU - Coats, J.C.
AU - Gronberg, T.J.
AU - Grosskopf, B.
N1 - Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2009/2/1
Y1 - 2009/2/1
N2 - We experimentally study contributing behavior to a threshold public good under simultaneous and sequential voluntary contribution mechanisms and investigate how refund policies interact with the mechanism. We find that, for a given refund rule, efficiency is greater under a sequential contribution mechanism than under a simultaneous contribution mechanism. Furthermore, for a given order of contributions, we find that full refund unambiguously achieves higher efficiency in the simultaneous mechanism while this is not the case in the sequential mechanism.
AB - We experimentally study contributing behavior to a threshold public good under simultaneous and sequential voluntary contribution mechanisms and investigate how refund policies interact with the mechanism. We find that, for a given refund rule, efficiency is greater under a sequential contribution mechanism than under a simultaneous contribution mechanism. Furthermore, for a given order of contributions, we find that full refund unambiguously achieves higher efficiency in the simultaneous mechanism while this is not the case in the sequential mechanism.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?partnerID=yv4JPVwI&eid=2-s2.0-57749174482&md5=7133158f6fc755822469d4a2771a293e
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.002
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:57749174482
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 93
SP - 326
EP - 335
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
IS - 1-2
ER -