Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection

Michalis Drouvelis, W Mueller, A Possajennikov

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a correct common prior in a two-person signaling game. Equilibrium selection arguments predict that different equilibria may be selected depending on whether the common prior is induced or not. Indeed, for a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior without an induced common prior is shown to be different from the long-run behavior when a common prior is induced, while for other distributions long-run behavior is similar under both regimes. We also present a learning model that allows players to learn about the other players' strategies and the prior distribution of the sender's type. We show that this learning model accurately accounts for all main features of the data. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)102-119
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behaviour
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2012


  • Equilibrium selection
  • Learning
  • Common prior
  • Signaling
  • Experiment


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