Safety in numbers? How reputation and others’ misconduct change the effect of herding on punishment

Maxine Yu, Cleo Silvestri, Lin Dong, Yuri Mishina

    Research output: Contribution to journalAbstractpeer-review

    Abstract

    The present study sheds light on the role of social-control agents in punishing misconduct. We posit that social-control agents give each violator a lighter sanction when a great number of people are involved in a misconduct case. However, this relationship is attenuated by violators’ reputation and by the salience of the misconduct to stakeholders before the current case. We test our hypotheses using suspension decisions in 458 doping cases in the context of professional road cycling between 1999 and 2019. Our results indicate that, in general, social-control agents’ punishments depend on internal resource constraints, but when pressure from stakeholders is high, the concern to protect the integrity of the field and their own authority prevails and leads to greater sanctions.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalAcademy of Management Proceedings
    Volume2021
    Issue number1
    Early online date26 Jul 2021
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2021
    EventThe 81st Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (AOM 2021): Bringing the Manager Back in Management - Virtual
    Duration: 29 Jul 20204 Aug 2020

    Keywords

    • AOM Annual Meeting Proceedings 2021

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