Representation and the Limits of Reason in Habermas’s Theory of Popular Sovereignty

Habermas’ theory of popular sovereignty has attracted both praise and opprobrium, but surprising little direct critical analysis. This article looks to remedy this omission, by locating what Habermas has to say about popular sovereignty within the context of his broader philosophical project. Doing this reveals that popular sovereignty plays a crucial role in Habermas’ account of the ‘rationalization of the lifeworld’, by mediating between the ‘facticity’ of existing political cultures and the ‘normativity’ of universalistic principles of political morality. This interpretation of Habermas is more nuanced than has been suggested by critical and sympathetic readers alike. But it also raises a challenge, since in order for popular sovereignty to play this mediating role, advocates of universalist principles must be able to successfully raise claims to be representing ‘the people’. Such claims takes us beyond the scope of communicative rationality, and instead direct us to the symbolic dimension of democracy. I conclude by suggesting that my analysis demonstrates a limit to the process of the rationalisation of the lifeworld which Habermas fails to acknowledge.