Relationality without obligation

James H P Lewis

doi:10.1093/analys/anab072

Relationality without obligation

James H P Lewis^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy, Theology and Religion

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	238-246
Number of pages	9
Journal	Analysis
Volume	82
Issue number	2
Early online date	4 Mar 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab072
Publication status	Published - Apr 2022

Access to Document

10.1093/analys/anab072

Cite this

@article{3faf50e3cac24e0f9aa1737cb23c39b4,

title = "Relationality without obligation",

abstract = "Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.",

author = "Lewis, \{James H P\}",

year = "2022",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1093/analys/anab072",

language = "English",

volume = "82",

pages = "238--246",

journal = "Analysis",

issn = "0003-2638",

publisher = "Oxford University Press",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Relationality without obligation

AU - Lewis, James H P

PY - 2022/4

Y1 - 2022/4

N2 - Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.

AB - Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.

U2 - 10.1093/analys/anab072

DO - 10.1093/analys/anab072

M3 - Article

SN - 0003-2638

VL - 82

SP - 238

EP - 246

JO - Analysis

JF - Analysis

IS - 2

ER -

Relationality without obligation

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this