Reconsidering the fiscal effects of constitutions

James Rockey*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)


This paper reconsiders Persson and Tabellini's (2003, 2004) analysis of the causal effect of constitution type on government size. It addresses the concerns of Acemoglu (2005) and makes some measurement and methodological refinements to the identification strategy to argue there is a qualitatively large and statistically significant relationship between constitution type and government size. The age of a democracy is of increased importance in the new identification strategy, but existing measures of when countries became democracies are shown to be flawed. Two new measures of the age of a democracy are introduced. The first details when a country first had a genuinely democratic election, the second when its current constitution was promulgated.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)313-323
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2012


  • Constitutions
  • Government spending
  • Instrumental variables

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations


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