Racism, epistemic injustice, and ideology critique

Sarah Bufkin*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

Since its 2007 publication, Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice has sparked a vigorous conversation in analytic philosophy about how social power corrodes individual’s epistemic capacities and distorts collective meaning-making in unjust ways. Yet for all its normative insights into social silencing, I argue that Fricker’s theorization of epistemic dysfunction remains too individualized, cognitivist, and dematerialized to account for racialized imaginaries. Rather than view racisms as normal and normative in racist cultures, Fricker frames identity-driven prejudice as a troubling aberration from otherwise unblemished epistemic and moral norms. This leads her into adopting an overly voluntarist and idealist theory of social change that centres training better knowers rather than unmaking racialized worlds. Ultimately, I contend that we should return to a materialist theory of ideology, following the work of Stuart Hall. Doing so jettisons the narrow focus on individual epistemic failures and instead problematizes how certain social ideas consolidate and reproduce racial hierarchies.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-25
Number of pages25
JournalPhilosophy and Social Criticism
Early online date12 Apr 2024
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 12 Apr 2024

Keywords

  • epistemic injustice
  • ideology
  • racism
  • Stuart Hall
  • testimonial injustice
  • silencing
  • ideology critique

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