Abstract
I describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing where private information affecting collective-value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. I show that unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbors and that these incentives are stronger and provision of the pure public good greater the smaller are individuals' social neighborhoods.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1019-1042 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | International Economic Review |
Volume | 55 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 28 Oct 2014 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2014 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics