Plundervolt: How a Little Bit of Undervolting Can Create a Lot of Trouble

Kit Murdock; David Oswald; Flavio Garcia; Jo Van Bulck; Daniel Gruss; Frank Piessens

doi:10.1109/MSEC.2020.2990495

Plundervolt: How a Little Bit of Undervolting Can Create a Lot of Trouble

Kit Murdock, David Oswald, Flavio Garcia, Jo Van Bulck, Daniel Gruss, Frank Piessens

Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

392 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Historically, fault injection was the realm of adversaries with physical access. This changed when research revealed that remote attackers could use software to inject faults. Plundervolt is a new software-based attack on Intel’s trusted execution technology (SGX). Plundervolt can break cryptography and inject memory-safety bugs into secure code.

Original language	English
Article number	9104908
Pages (from-to)	28-37
Journal	IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine
Volume	18
Issue number	5
Early online date	1 Jun 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2020.2990495
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Law

Access to Document

10.1109/MSEC.2020.2990495

Plundervolt__How a little bitAccepted author manuscript, 498 KB

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9104908/

User-controlled hardware security anchors: evaluation and designs
Garcia, F., Oswald, D. & Ryan, M.
Hewlett-Packard Incorporated Uk Ltd, Engineering & Physical Science Research Council
1/02/18 → 31/07/24
Project: Research

Cite this

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Plundervolt: How a Little Bit of Undervolting Can Create a Lot of Trouble

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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Projects

User-controlled hardware security anchors: evaluation and designs

Cite this