Online Appendix: A Theory of Social License When Regulatory Pressure is Jointly Produced by an EPA and an NGO

A. Heyes, A.M. Oestreich

Research output: Working paper/PreprintPreprint

Abstract

In this online Appendix we explore several modifications to the model in the main paper entitled "A Theory of Social License when Regulatory Pressure is Jointly Produced by an EPA and an NGO" (Journal of Regulatory Economics, forthcoming). Section 1 considers the case in which both regulators, EPA and NGO consider each others costs to some extend. Section 2 considers the case in which both regulators, EPA and NGO move sequentially instead of simultaneously. Section 3 considers the case in which both regulators, EPA and NGO can penalize non-compliant firms.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherSSRN
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Dec 2018

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