Abstract
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 471-477 |
Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
Volume | 49 |
Issue number | 6 |
Early online date | 27 Sept 2013 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2013 |
Keywords
- Revealed preference
- Consistency
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium