Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games

Indrajit Ray, S Snyder

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)471-477
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume49
Issue number6
Early online date27 Sep 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2013

Keywords

  • Revealed preference
  • Consistency
  • Subgame-perfect equilibrium

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