Abstract
This paper first outlines a new taxonomy of different views concerning the relationship between normative judgments and motivation. In this taxonomy, according to the Type A views, a positive normative judgment concerning an action consists at least in part of motivation to do that action. According to the Type B views, motivation is never a constituent of a positive normative judgment even if such judgments have, due to the kind of states they are, a causal power to produce motivation in an agent. Finally, according to the Type C views, a normative judgment can produce motivation only with the help of a third mental state or a distinct substantial local disposition. This paper then outlines a novel evolutionary argument for the Type B views. If we assume that normative judgments’ ability to shape our motivations enabled efficient planning and co-operation, the psychological mechanism responsible for this adaptation should be understood as a proximal mechanism. This paper argues that it is then more likely that we evolved to make normative judgments that have direct causal powers to influence our motivations because such Type B mechanisms are more reliable than the Type C mechanisms. It also suggests that the Type A views are either empirically false or collapse into the Type B views.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 23-48 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Filosofiska Notiser |
Volume | 10 |
Issue number | 1 |
Publication status | Published - 11 Apr 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Not yet published as of 20/03/2023Keywords
- normative judgments
- Moral Psychology
- Motivation
- Evolution
- Motivational Internalism