Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: testing for order effects

Giovanna D'Adda, Michalis Drouvelis, Daniele Nosenzo

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18 Citations (Scopus)
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We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment. We discuss how these results compare with those reported in the existing literature.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-7
JournalJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Early online date7 Mar 2016
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2016


  • Social norms
  • Norm elicitation
  • Order effects
  • Within-subject design
  • Bribery game


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