Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition

Monica A. Giovanniello, Carlo Perroni, Kimberley Scharf, Al Slivinski

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Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can protect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority. In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Early online date15 Oct 2018
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 15 Oct 2018


  • tax relief
  • private donations
  • strategic policy commitment


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