Naïve realism and the science of (some) illusions

Ian Phillips*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Critics have long complained that naïve realism cannot adequately account for perceptual illusion. This complaint has a tendency to ally itself with the aspersion that naïve realism is hopelessly out of touch with vision science. Here I offer a partial reply to both complaint and aspersion. I do so by showing how careful reflection on a simple, empirically grounded model of illusion reveals heterodox ways of thinking about familiar illusions which are quite congenial to the naïve realist.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)353-380
Number of pages28
JournalPhilosophical Topics
Volume44
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Naïve realism and the science of (some) illusions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this