Abstract
In chapter 8 of Miller [2003], 1 argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP [Nelson 2006], Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 337-341 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2009 |