MaximaGod and the problem of evil

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


I have argued elsewhere that nearly all existing arguments against Anselmian theism—such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God’s inability to sin, and the problem of evil—can be refuted all at once by holding that God possesses the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power and benevolence instead of insisting that He is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Some critics suggest, however, that my strategy fails, at least with respect to the problem of evil, because that problem undermines not only the version of theism that depends on God’s being omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, but also versions of theism that do not depend on that thesis. In this paper I defend my strategy against such a criticism.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationModels of God and Other Ultimate Realities
EditorsAsa Kasher, Jeanine Diller
ISBN (Electronic)978-94-007-5219-1
ISBN (Print)9400752180, 978-9400752184
Publication statusPublished - 26 Jun 2013


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