LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Recent research into automotive security has shown that once a single vehicle component is compromised, it is often possible to take full control of the vehicle. This paper proposes LeiA, a lightweight authentication protocol for the Controller Area Network (CAN). This protocol allows critical vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to authenticate each other providing compartmentalisation and preventing a number of attacks e.g., where a compromised CD player is able to accelerate the vehicle. LeiA is designed to run under the stringent time and
bandwidth constraints of automotive applications and is backwards compatible
with existing vehicle infrastructure. The protocol is suitable to be implemented using lightweight cryptographic primitives yet providing appropriate security levels by limiting the usage of every key in the system. The security of LeiA is proven under the unforgeability assumption of the MAC scheme under chosen message attacks (uf-cma).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationComputer Security – ESORICS 2016
Subtitle of host publication21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Heraklion, Greece, September 26-30, 2016, Proceedings, Part II
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-45741-3
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-45740-6
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Event21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2016) - Heraklion, Crete, Greece
Duration: 26 Sept 201630 Sept 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2016)
CityHeraklion, Crete


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