LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN

Andreea-Ina Radu; Flavio Garcia

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45741-3_15

LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN

Andreea-Ina Radu, Flavio Garcia

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

51 Citations (Scopus)

991 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Recent research into automotive security has shown that once a single vehicle component is compromised, it is often possible to take full control of the vehicle. This paper proposes LeiA, a lightweight authentication protocol for the Controller Area Network (CAN). This protocol allows critical vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to authenticate each other providing compartmentalisation and preventing a number of attacks e.g., where a compromised CD player is able to accelerate the vehicle. LeiA is designed to run under the stringent time and
bandwidth constraints of automotive applications and is backwards compatible
with existing vehicle infrastructure. The protocol is suitable to be implemented using lightweight cryptographic primitives yet providing appropriate security levels by limiting the usage of every key in the system. The security of LeiA is proven under the unforgeability assumption of the MAC scheme under chosen message attacks (uf-cma).

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Computer Security – ESORICS 2016
Subtitle of host publication	21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Heraklion, Greece, September 26-30, 2016, Proceedings, Part II
Publisher	Springer
Pages	283-300
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-45741-3
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-45740-6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45741-3_15
Publication status	Published - 2016
Event	21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2016) - Heraklion, Crete, Greece Duration: 26 Sept 2016 → 30 Sept 2016

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer
Volume	9879
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2016)
Country/Territory	Greece
City	Heraklion, Crete
Period	26/09/16 → 30/09/16

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-45741-3_15

Radu_&_Garcia_ LeiA_a_lightweight_authentication_protocol_ Proceedings of 21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/[insert DOI]
Accepted author manuscript, 404 KBLicence: None: All rights reserved

Cite this

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title = "LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN",

abstract = "Recent research into automotive security has shown that once a single vehicle component is compromised, it is often possible to take full control of the vehicle. This paper proposes LeiA, a lightweight authentication protocol for the Controller Area Network (CAN). This protocol allows critical vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to authenticate each other providing compartmentalisation and preventing a number of attacks e.g., where a compromised CD player is able to accelerate the vehicle. LeiA is designed to run under the stringent time andbandwidth constraints of automotive applications and is backwards compatiblewith existing vehicle infrastructure. The protocol is suitable to be implemented using lightweight cryptographic primitives yet providing appropriate security levels by limiting the usage of every key in the system. The security of LeiA is proven under the unforgeability assumption of the MAC scheme under chosen message attacks (uf-cma).",

author = "Andreea-Ina Radu and Flavio Garcia",

year = "2016",

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language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-319-45740-6",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer",

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}

Radu, A-I & Garcia, F 2016, LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN. in Computer Security – ESORICS 2016: 21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Heraklion, Greece, September 26-30, 2016, Proceedings, Part II. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9879, Springer, pp. 283-300, 21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2016), Heraklion, Crete, Greece, 26/09/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45741-3_15

LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN. / Radu, Andreea-Ina ; Garcia, Flavio.
Computer Security – ESORICS 2016: 21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Heraklion, Greece, September 26-30, 2016, Proceedings, Part II. Springer, 2016. p. 283-300 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9879).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AB - Recent research into automotive security has shown that once a single vehicle component is compromised, it is often possible to take full control of the vehicle. This paper proposes LeiA, a lightweight authentication protocol for the Controller Area Network (CAN). This protocol allows critical vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to authenticate each other providing compartmentalisation and preventing a number of attacks e.g., where a compromised CD player is able to accelerate the vehicle. LeiA is designed to run under the stringent time andbandwidth constraints of automotive applications and is backwards compatiblewith existing vehicle infrastructure. The protocol is suitable to be implemented using lightweight cryptographic primitives yet providing appropriate security levels by limiting the usage of every key in the system. The security of LeiA is proven under the unforgeability assumption of the MAC scheme under chosen message attacks (uf-cma).

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LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN

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