Abstract
In this article, I consider how the epistemic problem of religious disagreement has been viewed within the Islamic tradition. Specifically, I consider two religious epistemological trends within the tradition: Islamic Rationalism and Islamic Traditionalism. In examining the approaches of both trends toward addressing the epistemic problem, I suggest that neither is wholly adequate. Nonetheless, I argue that both approaches offer insights that might be relevant to building a more adequate response. So, I attempt to combine insights from both by drawing a distinction between inferential and noninferential reflective responsibility. Given this distinction, I argue that it may be possible for a theist to remain steadfast in upholding their tradition-specific theistic belief, without having to hold that belief by way of inference; but nevertheless, having to be sufficiently reflectively responsible in forming their theistic belief noninferentially.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 574 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Religions |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 May 2024 |
Keywords
- epistemology of disagreement
- reformed epistemology
- theistic evidentialism
- religious disagreement
- Islamic philosophy of religion