Is the Capgras delusion an endorsement of experience?

Federico Bongiorno

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    Abstract

    There is evidence indicating that the Capgras delusion is grounded in some kind of anomalous experience. According to the endorsement model, the content of the delusion is already encoded in the Capgras subject's experience, and the delusion is formed simply by endorsing that content as veridical. Elisabeth Pacherie and Sam Wilkinson have in different ways attempted to articulate a comprehensive defence of this strategy, but here I argue that the endorsement model cannot be defended along the lines envisioned by either of them. I then offer a more promising way of spelling out the model, according to which the anomalous experience implicated in Capgras is metaphorical in character.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalMind & Language
    Early online date25 Jun 2019
    DOIs
    Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 25 Jun 2019

    Keywords

    • Capgras
    • delusion
    • endorsement model
    • high‐level perception
    • metaphorical‐as perception

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