Idealism or Realism in the Process of EU Enlargement: The Case of Serbia

This article examines the on-going process of Serbia’s accession to the European Union from a realist perspective. This paper challenges the notion that EU enlargement has primarily been driven by a federalist agenda. Instead it applies a realist international relations theory in an inter-disciplinary way to the development of the legal and political order in an EU accession country. Putman’s seminal model of two level game is applied in a novel way to EU enlargement, in particular the case of Serbia. In this realist model EU member states are playing a two-level game where their interests are aggregated at the EU level. However, domestic constituencies and electorates in the EU have become less supportive of integration and enlargement. Furthermore, the key foreign policy challenges currently faced by the EU will not be resolved by enlargement. The article thus raises fundamental questions regarding the future utility of the EU enlargement strategy for both member states and accession countries.