Hybrid Human Rights? Persons, Property Rights, and Medical Devices

Given the general position in law that only things separate from persons can be subject to property rights, in this chapter, we ask whether medical devices and prostheses which are implanted into/integrated with the human body should be viewed as losing the property of being property. Our answer is that, for a range of pragmatic legal and philosophical reasons, they should not. We use hybridity as a means to conceptualise the joining of persons and medical devices/prostheses, arguing that a modified property (rights) approach may be necessary to adequately take account of both the object-ness of the device, as well as more subject-orientated considerations. We contend that whilst our suggested approach would be broadly compatible with the (human) right to bodily integrity, it cannot be collapsed into it. When it comes to hybrid humans’ devices, this right is only useful as part of a set of broader legal tools, including property rights.