Abstract
In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two types of indicator to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions, neither type of indicator depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that the social preferences we observe are robust to framing effects.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 254-272 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Experimental Economics |
Volume | 14 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 May 2011 |
Keywords
- Emotions
- Punishment
- Public goods experiments
- Framing effects