Abstract
Proponents of practice-dependent egalitarianism argue that egalitarian duties and entitlements only apply among participants in morally relevant practices. In this paper, I argue that these views are implausible because they allow for objectionable treatment of non-participants. I show that it is impossible, on the basis of practice-internal considerations alone, to determine the extent to which the pursuit of practices can permissibly limit the opportunities of non-participants. There are opportunities beyond the current holdings of practices to which no one has a privileged claim (such as unowned natural resources), and the distribution of which is a matter of justice. A just distribution of such unowned distributive goods, though, requires a practice-independent distributive baseline. I further show that such a baseline can only be egalitarian because all alternative baselines face serious objections. From this I conclude that any plausible theory of distributive justice must accept some form of equal practice-independent distributive entitlements.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 466-485 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 1 Jun 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- Global Egalitarianism
- Practice-Independent
- Distributive Justice