Exploring the resilience of some lightweight ciphers against profiled single trace attacks

Valentina Banciu; Elisabeth Oswald; Carolyn Whitnall

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_4

Exploring the resilience of some lightweight ciphers against profiled single trace attacks

Valentina Banciu^*, Elisabeth Oswald, Carolyn Whitnall

^*Corresponding author for this work

Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

This paper compares attack outcomes w.r.t. profiled single trace attacks of four different lightweight ciphers in order to investigate which of their properties, if any, contribute to attack success. We show that mainly the diffusion properties of both the round function and the key schedule play a role. In particular, the more (reasonably statistically independent) intermediate values are produced in a target implementation, the better attacks succeed. A crucial aspect for lightweight ciphers is hence the key schedule which is often designed to be particularly light. This design choice implies that information from all round keys can be easily combined which results in attacks that succeed with ease.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - 6th International Workshop, COSADE 2015, Revised Selected Papers
Editors	Stefan Mangard, Axel Y. Poschmann
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	51-63
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Print)	9783319214757
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_4
Publication status	Published - 2015
Event	6th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, COSADE 2015 - Berlin, Germany Duration: 13 Apr 2015 → 14 Apr 2015

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	9064
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	6th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, COSADE 2015
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Berlin
Period	13/04/15 → 14/04/15

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
V. Banciu has been supported by EPSRC via grant EP/ H049606/1. E. Oswald and C. Whitnall have been supported in part by EPSRC via grant EP/I005226/1. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for the useful comments and suggestions.

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_4

Cite this

Banciu, V., Oswald, E., & Whitnall, C. (2015). Exploring the resilience of some lightweight ciphers against profiled single trace attacks. In S. Mangard, & A. Y. Poschmann (Eds.), Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - 6th International Workshop, COSADE 2015, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 51-63). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9064). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_4

Banciu, Valentina ; Oswald, Elisabeth ; Whitnall, Carolyn. / Exploring the resilience of some lightweight ciphers against profiled single trace attacks. Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - 6th International Workshop, COSADE 2015, Revised Selected Papers. editor / Stefan Mangard ; Axel Y. Poschmann. Springer Verlag, 2015. pp. 51-63 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "This paper compares attack outcomes w.r.t. profiled single trace attacks of four different lightweight ciphers in order to investigate which of their properties, if any, contribute to attack success. We show that mainly the diffusion properties of both the round function and the key schedule play a role. In particular, the more (reasonably statistically independent) intermediate values are produced in a target implementation, the better attacks succeed. A crucial aspect for lightweight ciphers is hence the key schedule which is often designed to be particularly light. This design choice implies that information from all round keys can be easily combined which results in attacks that succeed with ease.",

author = "Valentina Banciu and Elisabeth Oswald and Carolyn Whitnall",

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Banciu, V, Oswald, E & Whitnall, C 2015, Exploring the resilience of some lightweight ciphers against profiled single trace attacks. in S Mangard & AY Poschmann (eds), Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - 6th International Workshop, COSADE 2015, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9064, Springer Verlag, pp. 51-63, 6th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, COSADE 2015, Berlin, Germany, 13/04/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_4

Exploring the resilience of some lightweight ciphers against profiled single trace attacks. / Banciu, Valentina; Oswald, Elisabeth; Whitnall, Carolyn.
Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - 6th International Workshop, COSADE 2015, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Stefan Mangard; Axel Y. Poschmann. Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 51-63 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9064).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AB - This paper compares attack outcomes w.r.t. profiled single trace attacks of four different lightweight ciphers in order to investigate which of their properties, if any, contribute to attack success. We show that mainly the diffusion properties of both the round function and the key schedule play a role. In particular, the more (reasonably statistically independent) intermediate values are produced in a target implementation, the better attacks succeed. A crucial aspect for lightweight ciphers is hence the key schedule which is often designed to be particularly light. This design choice implies that information from all round keys can be easily combined which results in attacks that succeed with ease.

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Banciu V, Oswald E, Whitnall C. Exploring the resilience of some lightweight ciphers against profiled single trace attacks. In Mangard S, Poschmann AY, editors, Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - 6th International Workshop, COSADE 2015, Revised Selected Papers. Springer Verlag. 2015. p. 51-63. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_4

Exploring the resilience of some lightweight ciphers against profiled single trace attacks

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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Cite this