Projects per year
Abstract
Online service provision is becoming increasingly decentralized as system designers pursue the benefits gained from utilizing nodes at the periphery of the network. However, distributing control means relying on the cooperation of participating agents, and it is a significant challenge to design mechanisms that incentivise optimal global behavior in a population of selfish, rational agents. This is particularly evident in peer-to-peer file-sharing, where a high incidence of selfish behavior in the form of downloading without uploading, leads to the network losing the benefits of a decentralized network. In this paper a notion of reputation based on simple social network analysis is used to significantly improve cooperation rates in the one-shot game of prisoner's dilemma, where without such a technique the dominant strategy would be for all agents to defect.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, 2007. CEC 2007. |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) |
| Pages | 736-743 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-1-4244-1340-9 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-1-4244-1339-3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Sept 2007 |
| Event | IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, 2007 (CEC 2007) - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 25 Sept 2007 → 28 Sept 2007 |
Conference
| Conference | IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, 2007 (CEC 2007) |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Singapore |
| City | Singapore |
| Period | 25/09/07 → 28/09/07 |
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Evolving Cooperation in the Non-iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: A social network inspired approach'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished
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Market Based Control of Complex Computational Systems
Yao, X. (Principal Investigator)
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council
1/10/04 → 31/03/10
Project: Research Councils