Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems

Peter Lewis; Paul Marrow; Xin Yao

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-87700-4_106

Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems

Peter Lewis, Paul Marrow, Xin Yao

Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to conference (unpublished) › Paper › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

199 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers. Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe. Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.

Original language	English
Pages	1071-1080
Number of pages	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87700-4_106
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2008
Event	Parallel Problem Solving from Nature – PPSN X: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference - Berlin, Heidelberg Duration: 1 Sept 2008 → …

Conference

Conference	Parallel Problem Solving from Nature – PPSN X: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
City	Berlin, Heidelberg
Period	1/09/08 → …

Keywords

market-based control
load-balancing
self-interested agents
co-evolution
decentralised systems

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-87700-4_106

evoagentspaper.pdf

http://www.springerlink.com/content/m2j7578765688370/

Market Based Control of Complex Computational Systems
Yao, X.
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council
1/10/04 → 31/03/10
Project: Research Councils

Cite this

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AB - We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers. Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe. Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.

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KW - load-balancing

KW - self-interested agents

KW - co-evolution

KW - decentralised systems

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Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

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Projects

Market Based Control of Complex Computational Systems

Cite this