Epistemic Discrimination

This chapter provides a critical overview of issues relating to epistemic discrimination. It begins by introducing the reader to the most prominent account of epistemic discrimination: Miranda Fricker’s (2007) discussion of epistemic injustice. Two limitations of Fricker’s position are highlighted: (i) it underestimates the understanding possessed by victims of epistemic discrimination; (ii) it underplays the damage done to the epistemic character of members of dominant groups. Other accounts of epistemic discrimination that avoid these shortcomings—Patricia Hill Collins’ Black Feminist Thought and Charles Mills’ discussion of white ignorance—are then introduced. Next, there is an examination of two specific mechanisms through which epistemic discrimination can manifest: silencing and implicit bias. It is shown how the two can interact. Finally, measures that can be used to reduce epistemic discrimination are discussed, with special emphasis on the benefits of being informed by the aforementioned understanding of victims of epistemic discrimination.