Abstract
This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | 4OR |
| Early online date | 17 Apr 2020 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 17 Apr 2020 |
Keywords
- Games/group decisions: strategic queueing
- Queues—Applications: strategic interactions
- Queues—Multichannel: determining number
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management Information Systems
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Endogenous Queue Number Determination in G/M/s Systems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver