Educating moral emotions or moral selves: A false dichotomy?

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    Abstract

    In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a 'moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as 'identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)397-409
    Number of pages13
    JournalEducational Philosophy and Theory
    Volume42
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2010

    Bibliographical note

    Copyright 2010 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

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