Does local competition and firm market power affect investment adviser misconduct?

Michael Gelman, Zaheer Khan, Amir Shoham, Shlomo Y. Tarba*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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This paper examines the impact of local competition and local firm market power on misconduct by analyzing the investment adviser market. The study is based on an extensive sample of more than 3.8 million employee-year observations of investment advisers resulting in 709,416 firm-county-year observations over 12 years. The findings show that a firm's county-level market power and county market competition have a negative influence on investment adviser misconduct. The result is robust to a battery of empirical tests. We show that a firm exhibits lower levels of misconduct in counties in which it has greater local market power. We also identify the effect of local competition and market power on misconduct using two exogenous shocks, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and the end of a local monopoly. We establish adviser employment stability as a novel channel for explaining the impact of local competition and firm market power on misconduct.

Original languageEnglish
Article number101810
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Early online date3 Dec 2020
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier B.V.


  • Corporate fraud
  • HHI
  • Investment adviser
  • Local competition
  • Local market power
  • Misconduct

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management


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