Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity

Alastair Wilson

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1

Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity

Alastair Wilson

Philosophy

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8 Citations (Scopus)

304 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	321-326
Number of pages	6
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	149
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1
Publication status	Published - 10 Mar 2009

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Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity

Abstract

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