Device attacker models: Fact and fiction

Jiangshan Yu; Mark D. Ryan

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_17

Device attacker models: Fact and fiction

Jiangshan Yu
, Mark D. Ryan^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

According to standard fiction, a user is able to securely keep long term keys on his device. However, in fact his device may become infected with malware, and an adversary may obtain a copy of his key. We propose an attacker model in which devices are “periodically trustworthy” — they may become infected by malware, and then later become trustworthy again after software patches and malware scans have been applied, in an ongoing cycle. This paper proposes a solution to make the usage of private keys by attackers detectable by using public transparently-maintained logs to monitor the usage of long-term secret keys.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Security Protocols XXIII - 23rd International Workshop, Revised Selected Papers
Editors	Frank Stajano, Jonathan Anderson, Bruce Christianson, James Malcolm, Petr Švenda, Vashek Matyáš
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	158-167
Number of pages	10
ISBN (Print)	9783319260952
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_17
Publication status	Published - 2015
Event	23rd International Workshop on Security Protocols, 2015 - Cambridge, United Kingdom Duration: 31 Mar 2015 → 2 Apr 2015

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	9379
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	23rd International Workshop on Security Protocols, 2015
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	Cambridge
Period	31/03/15 → 2/04/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.

Keywords

Attacker model
Key compromise detection
Key usage Monitoring

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_17

Cite this

Yu, J., & Ryan, M. D. (2015). Device attacker models: Fact and fiction. In F. Stajano, J. Anderson, B. Christianson, J. Malcolm, P. Švenda, & V. Matyáš (Eds.), Security Protocols XXIII - 23rd International Workshop, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 158-167). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9379). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_17

Yu, Jiangshan ; Ryan, Mark D. / Device attacker models : Fact and fiction. Security Protocols XXIII - 23rd International Workshop, Revised Selected Papers. editor / Frank Stajano ; Jonathan Anderson ; Bruce Christianson ; James Malcolm ; Petr Švenda ; Vashek Matyáš. Springer Verlag, 2015. pp. 158-167 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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title = "Device attacker models: Fact and fiction",

abstract = "According to standard fiction, a user is able to securely keep long term keys on his device. However, in fact his device may become infected with malware, and an adversary may obtain a copy of his key. We propose an attacker model in which devices are “periodically trustworthy” — they may become infected by malware, and then later become trustworthy again after software patches and malware scans have been applied, in an ongoing cycle. This paper proposes a solution to make the usage of private keys by attackers detectable by using public transparently-maintained logs to monitor the usage of long-term secret keys.",

keywords = "Attacker model, Key compromise detection, Key usage Monitoring",

author = "Jiangshan Yu and Ryan, \{Mark D.\}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.; 23rd International Workshop on Security Protocols, 2015 ; Conference date: 31-03-2015 Through 02-04-2015",

year = "2015",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9\_17",

language = "English",

isbn = "9783319260952",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

pages = "158--167",

editor = "Frank Stajano and Jonathan Anderson and Bruce Christianson and James Malcolm and Petr {\v S}venda and Vashek Maty{\'a}{\v s}",

booktitle = "Security Protocols XXIII - 23rd International Workshop, Revised Selected Papers",

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Yu, J & Ryan, MD 2015, Device attacker models: Fact and fiction. in F Stajano, J Anderson, B Christianson, J Malcolm, P Švenda & V Matyáš (eds), Security Protocols XXIII - 23rd International Workshop, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9379, Springer Verlag, pp. 158-167, 23rd International Workshop on Security Protocols, 2015, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 31/03/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_17

Device attacker models: Fact and fiction. / Yu, Jiangshan; Ryan, Mark D.
Security Protocols XXIII - 23rd International Workshop, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Frank Stajano; Jonathan Anderson; Bruce Christianson; James Malcolm; Petr Švenda; Vashek Matyáš. Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 158-167 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9379).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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N2 - According to standard fiction, a user is able to securely keep long term keys on his device. However, in fact his device may become infected with malware, and an adversary may obtain a copy of his key. We propose an attacker model in which devices are “periodically trustworthy” — they may become infected by malware, and then later become trustworthy again after software patches and malware scans have been applied, in an ongoing cycle. This paper proposes a solution to make the usage of private keys by attackers detectable by using public transparently-maintained logs to monitor the usage of long-term secret keys.

AB - According to standard fiction, a user is able to securely keep long term keys on his device. However, in fact his device may become infected with malware, and an adversary may obtain a copy of his key. We propose an attacker model in which devices are “periodically trustworthy” — they may become infected by malware, and then later become trustworthy again after software patches and malware scans have been applied, in an ongoing cycle. This paper proposes a solution to make the usage of private keys by attackers detectable by using public transparently-maintained logs to monitor the usage of long-term secret keys.

KW - Attacker model

KW - Key compromise detection

KW - Key usage Monitoring

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DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_17

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AN - SCOPUS:84952767907

SN - 9783319260952

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 158

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BT - Security Protocols XXIII - 23rd International Workshop, Revised Selected Papers

A2 - Stajano, Frank

A2 - Anderson, Jonathan

A2 - Christianson, Bruce

A2 - Malcolm, James

A2 - Švenda, Petr

A2 - Matyáš, Vashek

PB - Springer Verlag

Y2 - 31 March 2015 through 2 April 2015

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Yu J, Ryan MD. Device attacker models: Fact and fiction. In Stajano F, Anderson J, Christianson B, Malcolm J, Švenda P, Matyáš V, editors, Security Protocols XXIII - 23rd International Workshop, Revised Selected Papers. Springer Verlag. 2015. p. 158-167. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_17

Device attacker models: Fact and fiction

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this