Democratic backsliding and public administration in Pakistan’s hybrid regime: a balance of power approach

Democratic backsliding has garnered significant attention in recent years (V-Dem Citation2023), though the relationship with public administration has received less attention. The emphasis of the literature has been on erosion in liberal democracies and less so on intra-regime changes in non-democracies (Waldner and Lust Citation2018). I take a case study approach to explore democratic backsliding within Pakistan’s tutelary hybrid regime, using Waldner and Lust’s (Citation2018) “balance-of-power framework” and Khan’s concept of “holding power” to contextualise the case. I adapt Waldner and Lust’s identification of democratic institutional effects to Pakistan, arguing that tutelary hybrid regimes not only weaken both political institutions and public administration in and of themselves, but also skew the incentives of politicians and bureaucrats driving them to undermine the system of public administration in pursuit of personal advantage. This produces a vicious cycle, trapping countries like Pakistan in persistently poor public policies, services, and administration, and stagnant or eroding democratic norms and practices. The Pakistani case is an interesting comparator for other postcolonial countries for understanding the inter-related nature of public administration and democratic backsliding. More broadly, I contribute to the literature on understanding how bureaucratic politics plays an essential role in understanding democratic and authoritarian trajectories.