TY - CHAP
T1 - Delusion and Meaning
AU - Ritunnano, Rosa
AU - Littlemore, Jeannette
PY - 2024/11/15
Y1 - 2024/11/15
N2 - The territory of meaning in delusions can be carved up in many ways, depending on the different senses of the word ‘meaning’. In this chapter, we address three main philosophical questions arising from three distinct regions of meaning: psychological meaningfulness, felt meaning, and metaphorical meaning. There are many ways in which delusions are harmful or can lead to harm, but there is also increasing evidence that they can be lived through at certain times, and in certain contexts, as meaningful. To solve this apparent tension, we adopt a dynamical perspective on delusions as complex, performative, and situated phenomena arising through multiple layers of meaning-making across embodied, psychological, linguistic, and social levels of analysis. Within this framework, we consider the felt dimension of experiencing as a generative locus of meaning, particularly for those delusions referred to as ‘primary’ and described by Jaspers as analogous to the seeing of meaning. However, meaning is not only felt but also articulated in delusions through linguistic and cognitive acts of meaning-making which operate at the boundaries between the literal and metaphorical. Here, we encounter both a blurring of these boundaries and the boundaries between ‘novel’ or unconventional uses of metaphors. Guided by these insights, we suggest that our ability to genuinely engage with delusional discourse may improve once we understand delusions as expressive attempts at articulating felt meaning and understanding, rather than unshakeable assertions of truth.
AB - The territory of meaning in delusions can be carved up in many ways, depending on the different senses of the word ‘meaning’. In this chapter, we address three main philosophical questions arising from three distinct regions of meaning: psychological meaningfulness, felt meaning, and metaphorical meaning. There are many ways in which delusions are harmful or can lead to harm, but there is also increasing evidence that they can be lived through at certain times, and in certain contexts, as meaningful. To solve this apparent tension, we adopt a dynamical perspective on delusions as complex, performative, and situated phenomena arising through multiple layers of meaning-making across embodied, psychological, linguistic, and social levels of analysis. Within this framework, we consider the felt dimension of experiencing as a generative locus of meaning, particularly for those delusions referred to as ‘primary’ and described by Jaspers as analogous to the seeing of meaning. However, meaning is not only felt but also articulated in delusions through linguistic and cognitive acts of meaning-making which operate at the boundaries between the literal and metaphorical. Here, we encounter both a blurring of these boundaries and the boundaries between ‘novel’ or unconventional uses of metaphors. Guided by these insights, we suggest that our ability to genuinely engage with delusional discourse may improve once we understand delusions as expressive attempts at articulating felt meaning and understanding, rather than unshakeable assertions of truth.
UR - https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Philosophy-of-Delusion/Sullivan-Bissett/p/book/9781032283388
M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)
SN - 9781032283388
SN - 9781032283432
T3 - Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy
SP - 46
EP - 61
BT - The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion
A2 - Sullivan-Bisset, Emma
PB - Routledge
CY - London
ER -