Abstract
Recently, the substance view of persons has been heavily criticized for the counterintuitive conclusions it seems to imply in scenarios such as embryo rescue cases and embryo loss. These criticisms have obscured the considerable success of the substance view in supporting other intuitions that are widely shared, and that competing accounts such as the psychological view have difficulties accounting for. Here, I examine common intuitions regarding identity, human exceptionalism, the moral equality of children and adults, infanticide, and prenatal injury. I conclude that when we broaden the range of intuitions examined, the substance view emerges as just as plausible an account of our nature as the more widely accepted psychological view.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 54-67 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | The New Bioethics |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 21 Nov 2021 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2 Jan 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The author(s) reported there is no funding associated with the work featured in this article. I would like to thank Jeremy Williams for the discussion that motivated this paper. I am also grateful for the very helpful feedback provided by Daniel Rodger and Nicholas Colgrove, as well as two anonymous reviewers.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Keywords
- abortion
- moral intuition
- person
- personal identity
- psychological view
- substance view
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Issues, ethics and legal aspects
- Reproductive Medicine
- Health Policy
- Genetics(clinical)