Abstract
We contribute to MNE-state relations research focusing on criminal multinational enterprises (CMNEs) as distinct entities in the global economy. CMNE-host state relations vary from competitive confrontation to complicity, state capture, even state-led criminal activity. While developed country CMNE-host state relations are strongly influenced by relative bargaining power, developing economies may adopt complicit relations affecting stability and development. Applying transaction cost concepts to (criminal) locational attractiveness and state strength, we examine possible forms of association (competitive, complicit and state-capture) and their determinants. Criminal multinationals that collaborate with state officials to forge narrow and exclusive bargains negatively impact equitable institutional and economic development. The nature of CMNE-host state relations also strongly influence the structure and strategies of criminal multinationals, understanding of which should underpin anti-crime policies.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 51–67 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Multinational Business Review |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 8 Dec 2025 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 26 Feb 2026 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Keywords
- Transaction cost theory
- Criminal multinationals
- State complicity
- Anti-crime policies
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