Projects per year
Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individualbased institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a wellmixed, finite population. In this scheme, the individuals in the population interact via cooperation dilemmas (Donation Game or Public Goods Game) in which institutional reward is carried out only if cooperation is not abundant enough (i.e., the number of cooperators is below a threshold 1≤t≤N−1, where N is the population size); and similarly, institutional punishment is carried out only when defection is too abundant. We study analytically the cases t=1 for the reward incentive under the small mutation limit assumption and two different initial states, showing that the cost function is always nondecreasing. We derive the neutral drift and strong selection limits when the intensity of selection tends to zero and infinity, respectively. We numerically investigate the problem for other values of t and for population dynamics with arbitrary mutation rates.
Original language  English 

Article number  115 
Number of pages  43 
Journal  Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 
Volume  86 
DOIs  
Publication status  Published  5 Aug 2024 
Keywords
 Evolutionary game theory
 Population dynamics

Evolutionary Game Theory Under Uncertainty
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council
1/05/24 → 31/01/26
Project: Research Councils

Model reduction in evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
31/03/23 → 30/03/25
Project: Research Councils

Variational structures, convergence to equilibrium and multiscale analysis for nonMarkovian systems
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council
1/02/22 → 30/06/24
Project: Research Councils