Corporate governance and the political economy of the company

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Abstract

This chapter argues that the legal architecture of the company obfuscates the political relationship between shareholder and employees and transforms captured value from employees into a transferable and fungible property form. It sets out this claim within a Marxian analysis of the political economy mapped onto the legal architecture of the company. Following on from this analysis, the chapter also demonstrates that recent initiatives that exhort shareholders to govern the company and to monitor company executives – through for example, the rapidly proliferating Stewardship Codes – attempt to subvert the legal and economic nature of modern shareholders as rentiers, to ill effect.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Cambridge Handbook of Sustainability and Corporate Governance
EditorsBeate Sjåfjell, Christopher M. Bruner
PublisherCambridge University Press
Chapter7
Pages86-99
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)9781108658386
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2019

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