Children's sensitivity to their own relative ignorance: Handling of possibilities under epistemic and physical uncertainty

Elizabeth Robinson, M Rowley, Sarah Beck, Daniel Carroll, Ian Apperly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

39 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 (N=61), 4- to 6-year-olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 (N=30; 5- to 6-year-olds) and 3 (N=80; 5- to 8-year-olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one. The results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and "curse of knowledge."
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1642-1655
Number of pages14
JournalChild Development
Volume77
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2006

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