@inbook{692e9c2a2b8e4b80ae2cda6bee6bf809,
title = "Chance and Context",
abstract = "The most familiar philosophical conception of objective chance renders determinism incompatible with non-trivial chances. This conception – associated in particular with the work of David Lewis – is not a good fit with our use of the word {\textquoteleft}chance{\textquoteright} and its cognates in ordinary discourse. In this paper we show how a generalized framework for chance can reconcile determinism with non-trivial chances, and provide for a more charitable interpretation of ordinary chance-talk. According to our proposal, variation in an admissible {\textquoteleft}evidence base{\textquoteright} generates a spectrum of different chance functions. Successive coarse-grainings of the evidence base generates a partial ordering of chance functions, with finer trumping coarser if known. We suggest that chance-attributions in ordinary discourse express different chance functions in different contexts, and we sketch a potential contextual mechanism for making particular chance functions salient. The mechanism involves the idea that admissible evidence is available evidence: propositions that could be known. A consequence is that attributions of objective chances inherit the relatively familiar context-sensitivity associated with the modal {\textquoteleft}could{\textquoteright}. We show how this context-dependency undermines certain arguments for the incompatibility of chance with determinism.",
author = "Alastair Wilson and Toby Handfield",
year = "2014",
month = sep,
day = "4",
doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0001",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780199673421",
pages = "19--44",
editor = "Alastair Wilson",
booktitle = "Chance and Temporal Asymmetry",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
address = "United Kingdom",
}