Caveat coercitor: Coercion-evidence in electronic voting

Gurchetan S. Grewal, Mark D. Ryan, Sergiu Bursuc, Peter Y.A. Ryan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The balance between coercion-resistance, election verifiability and usability remains unresolved in remote electronic voting despite significant research over the last few years. We propose a change of perspective, replacing the requirement of coercion-resistance with a new requirement of coercion- evidence: there should be public evidence of the amount of coercion that has taken place during a particular execution of the voting system. We provide a formal definition of coercion-evidence that has two parts. Firstly, there should be a coercion-evidence test that can be performed against the bulletin board to accurately determine the degree of coercion that has taken place in any given run. Secondly, we require coercer independence, that is the ability of the voter to follow the protocol without being detected by the coercer. To show how coercion-evidence can be achieved, we propose a new remote voting scheme, Caveat Coercitor, and we prove that it satisfies coercion-evidence. Moreover, Caveat Coercitor makes weaker trust assumptions than other remote voting systems, such as JCJ/Civitas and Helios, and has better usability properties.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2013
Pages367-381
Number of pages15
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Event34th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2013 - San Francisco, CA, United States
Duration: 19 May 201322 May 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ISSN (Print)1081-6011

Conference

Conference34th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Francisco, CA
Period19/05/1322/05/13

Keywords

  • coercion evidence
  • Coercion resistance
  • electronic voting
  • security models
  • security protocols
  • usability
  • verifiable elections

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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