Can private giving promote economic segregation?

Ignatius J. Horstmann, Al Slivinski*, Kimberley Scharf

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and individual location choice. Tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects; however, through its effects on public provision choices, such relief may affect individual location decisions and, in so doing, has an impact on the jurisdictional configurations that can arise in equilibrium. For some demographic parameters it will promote economic segregation rather than integration, while for others, the opposite is true. In the former scenario, a ban on local tax incentives for giving would be Pareto improving and would thus be sanctioned by a majority-supported federal tax constitution.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1095-1118
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume91
Issue number5-6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2007

Keywords

  • Jurisdiction formation
  • Private provision of public goods

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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