Abstract
The epistemic credentials of introspection are often overestimated by philosophers and psychologists in their theorizing. This point has been argued in recent literature; yet a sceptical position on introspection which recommends its wholesale rejection as a source of knowledge is not credible. We can and do know things about our own minds by introspection. A sensible view on introspection is therefore moderate in its scepticism. It is surprisingly hard, however, to make a principled case for such a position. In this paper, I put forward and defend a moderate scepticism about introspection. I show how this position yields the resources to pin down the scope and content of introspective knowledge. A major attraction of the view is that it provides a strategy for solving a problem which has vexed the scientific study of consciousness from its inception.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 300-321 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Philosophical Issues |
Volume | 25 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 12 Oct 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2015 |
Keywords
- Introspection