Abstract
In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on the claim that the replacement of normative standards would license optimistic verdicts about human rationality.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 131-150 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Philosophy of the Social Sciences |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 26 Nov 2013 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2014 |
Keywords
- rationality
- heuristics
- cognitive biases
- adaptive behavior