Automating Cryptographic Protocol Language Generation from Structured Specifications

Automating Cryptographic Protocol Language Generation from Structured Specifications - FormaliSE 22 Reproducibility package

This folder will contain all the necessary files to replicate the results from the homonymous paper at FormaliSE 22, and run the tool. Please see README for details.

Abstract

Security of cryptographic protocols can be analysed by creating a model in a formal language and verifying the model in a tool. All such tools focus on the last part of the analysis, verification, and the interpretation of the specification is only explained in papers. Rather, we focus on the interpretation and modelling part by presenting a tool to aid the cryptographer throughout the process and automatically generating code in a target language. We adopt a data-centric approach where the protocol design is stored in a structured way rather than as textual specifications. Previous work shows how this approach facilitates the interpretation to a single language (for Tamarin) which required aftermath modifications.
By improving the expressiveness of the specification data structure we extend the tool to export to an additional formal language, ProVerif, as well as a C++ fully running implementation. Furthermore, we extend the plugins to verify correctness in ProVerif and executability lemmas in Tamarin. In this paper we model the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which is traditionally used as a case study; a demo is also provided for other commonly studied protocols, Needham-Schroeder and Needham-Schroeder-Lowe.