Are knowledge- and belief-reasoning automatic, and is this the right question?

Andrew Surtees, Todd Andrew

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

Phillips et al. conclude that current evidence supports knowledge-, but not belief-reasoning as being automatic. We suggest four reasons why this is an oversimplified answer to a question that might not have a clear-cut answer: (1) knowledge and beliefs can be incompletely equated to perceptual states, (2) sensitivity to mental states does not necessitate representation, (3) automaticity is not a single categorical feature, and (4) how we represent others' minds is dependent on social context.
Original languageEnglish
Article numbere172
JournalBehavioural and Brain Sciences
Volume44
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19 Nov 2021

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