Abstract
This paper introduces quasi-aggregative games and establishes conditions under which such games admit a best-reply potential. This implies existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium without any convexity or quasi-concavity assumptions. It also implies convergence of best-reply dynamics under some additional assumptions. Most of the existing literature's aggregation concepts are special cases of quasi-aggregative games, and many new situations are allowed for. An example is payoff functions that depend on own strategies as well as a linear combination of the mean and the variance of players' strategies.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 45-66 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 43 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2010 |
Keywords
- Aggregative games
- Strategic substitutes
- Nash equilibrium
- Potential game
- Aggregation
- Best-reply dynamics