Aggregative games and best-reply potentials

Martin Jensen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

106 Citations (Scopus)


This paper introduces quasi-aggregative games and establishes conditions under which such games admit a best-reply potential. This implies existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium without any convexity or quasi-concavity assumptions. It also implies convergence of best-reply dynamics under some additional assumptions. Most of the existing literature's aggregation concepts are special cases of quasi-aggregative games, and many new situations are allowed for. An example is payoff functions that depend on own strategies as well as a linear combination of the mean and the variance of players' strategies.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)45-66
Number of pages22
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2010


  • Aggregative games
  • Strategic substitutes
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Potential game
  • Aggregation
  • Best-reply dynamics


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