Abstract
Vaccination is widely recognised as one of the most effective forms of public health interventions. Individuals decisions regarding vaccination creates a complex social dilemma between individual and collective interests, where each person's decision affects the overall public health outcome. In this paper, we study the adaptive dynamics for the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in a fundamental game-theoretic model of vaccination. We show the existence of an (Nash) equilibrium and analyse the stability and bifurcations when varying the relevant parameters. We also demonstrate our analytical results by several concrete examples.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of Dynamics and Games |
| Early online date | 31 Jul 2025 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 31 Jul 2025 |
Keywords
- Dynamical systems
- adaptive dynamics
- vaccination
- bifurcations
- ODE
Access to Document
- BalabanovaN2025Adaptive
This article has been published in a revised form in Journal of Dynamics and Games [https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2025037]. This version is free to download for private research and study only. Not for redistribution, re-sale or use in derivative works.