A robust incentive consensus propagation design for consortium-chain based wireless network

In the consortium-chain based wireless networks, edge service providers (ESPs) can act as pre-selected miners to maintain the blockchain network and obtained reward from the blockchain user. To make the network more secure, ESPs can recruit nearby mobile devices (NMDs) as lightweight verifiers during the block propagation process. However, with the increasing of verifiers, the propagation overhead is also increasing. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between the recruit ratios of ESPs and the transaction fee of blockchain user. In this paper, we propose a consortium-chain based wireless network architecture, and investigate the trade-off under the circumstance that some NMDs maybe crashed. The problem can be formulated as a two-stage robust Stackelberg game (RSG) approach. We provide the theoretical analysis of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium point, and use the Lagrange dual decomposition method (LDDM) to obtain the Nash equilibrium point. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed RSG approach outperforms other schemes in efficiency and robustness during the block propagation process.